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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH } 
CORPORATION, a Delaware } 
Corporation, } 
) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Respondent, } 
} 
vs. ) No. 16643 
) 
NADEEM M. MUNA, } 
} 
Defendant- } 
Appellant. } 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against its former 
president and general manager for injunctive relief prohibiting 
Defendan~ from competing with Plaintiff as to products developed 
during Defendant's employment, prohibiting Defendant from utiliz-
ing Plaintiff's customer lists, and seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A temporary restraining order was issued by the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer on September 28, 1978 enjoin~ng Defendant from 
soliciting Plaintiff's customers or from making use of Plain-
tiff's methods of manufacturing. Subsequently, a preliminary 
injunction was issued by the lower court restraining Defendant 
from soliciting Plaintiff's customers, using Plaintiff's methods 
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of manufacture, competing with Plaintiff in the sale of four 
specified medical test kits, and assisting any competitors of 
Plaintiff in the production of such kits. 
After a full trial on the merits the court issued a per-
manent injunction restraining Defendant from soliciting Plain-
tiff's customers, from competing with the plaintiff in any of 
its present product lines or services for a period of two years, 
and requiring an accounting for any profits derived from Plain-
tiff's customers. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the permanent injunction granted 
by the trial court be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not seriously dispute the majority of the 
statements made in "Appellant's Statement of Facts." (Appel-
lant's brief, pp. 2-9). Respondent believes, however that Ap-
pellant has made certain implications in this Statement which 
is not supported by the record or which is speculation on his 
part. Respondent MRC shall address these factual inaccuracies 
during the Argument portion of this Brief. 
It is Respondent's position that the findings of the lower 
court both adequately outline the factual context of this case 
and are also supported by competent evidence. It is a fundamen-
tal rule of this Court that findings supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. McMahon v. 
-2-
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Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Utah 1953). 
A review of the facts in light of the evidence as believed 
by the Trial Court, reasonably supports the Trial Court's fac-
tual findings. Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976). 
The findings of the trial court (R. Vol. II, pp. 12-15) and 
evidence supporting such findings are as follows: 
"l. Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the 
laws of the State of Delaware with its principal offices and 
place of business located in Bountiful, Davis County, Utah." 
(R., pp. l, 23). 
"2. Defendant Nadeem M. Muna is a resident of Davis County, 
State of Utah." (Transcript of July 10 and July 11, 1979 hear-
ing, hereinafter Tr., p. 129). 
"3. That Defendant Nadeem M. Muna was employed by the 
plaintiff Microbiological Research Corporation as its president 
and chief executive officer from September, 1968, until February, 
1978." (Tr., pp. 17, 136). 
"That as president of Plaintiff's corporation Defendant 
Nadeem M. Muna was in a position to learn and did learn Plain-
tiff's confidential, proprietary and secret methods of operation 
such as clientele lists, combinations of chemicals, methods of 
production, all of which were used by Plaintiff during Defen-
dant's employment with Plaintiff. 
"It was necessary and unavoidable that Defendant Muna should 
learn in confidence all of the foregoing confidential, proprie-
-3-
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tary and secret information of Plaintiff." lTr., pp. 39, 61, 
137, 164; Mawod Depo., pp. 46-50). 
"4. That the foregoing confidential, proprietary and se-
cret property of the plaintiff was and continues to be of sub-
stantial and significant value to the plaintiff in the success-
ful conduct of its business." (Tr., pp. 22, 23, 38, 61, 91, 
120, 229; Exhibits 8, 19, 33). 
"5. That in the manufacture of Ilerpes I and II test kits, 
Antinuclear Binding Antibody test kits, toxoplasmosis test kits, 
and the infectious mononucleosis test kits, the plaintiff has 
trade secrets that are of importance and confer upon Plaintiff 
an advantage in the marketplace." lTr., pp. 7, 77, 79, 135, 
163; Exhibits, 13, 361. 
11 6. That !>aid trade secrets were developed by Defendant 
for the plaintiff's benefit while Defendant was an employee of 
Plaintiff and while Defendant was charged by the plaintiff with 
the responsibility of developing these human diagnostic test kits 
to which said trade secrets now apply." (Tr., pp. 12, 29, 75, 
79, 92, 93, 187, 190). 
"7. That Plaintiff's process for the test kits referred 
to in paragraph .S above, taken as a whole, is not known to the 
industry and is guarded by Plaintiff's security precautions. 
(Tr., pp. 22, 23, 25, 26, 75, 79, 82, 111, 225, 2291. 
"8. That Plaintiff uses certain formulations of chemicals 
and nutrients in the propagation of its cell lines as well as 
-4-
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certain techniques and chemical formulations in the manufacturing 
process that are known only to the plaintiff and are of value 
and confer a competitive advantage to Plaintiff." (Tr., pp. 45, 
76, 77, 80, 85, 86, 88, 91, 111, 117, 120, 123, 149, 155, 157, 
160, 167, 243; Exhibits 1, 11, 15). 
"9. That the formulation referred to in paragraph 8 above 
was developed for Plaintiff by Defendant while Defendant was in 
Plaintiff's employ." (Tr., pp. 29, 92, 117, 132, 135, 136, 
159, 161, 164). 
"10. That in February of 1978, Defendant lost his bid for 
reelection as president of Plaintiff corporation and thereinafter 
on or about the 28th day of February, 1978, entered into a se-
cond employment agreement with Plaintiff." (.Tr., pp. 18, 63, 1791 
Exhibit 23). 
"11. That on or about the 4th day of September, 1968 the 
defendant Nadeem M. Muna for good and sufficient consideration 
entered into an employment contract with the plaintiff's prede-
cessor Microbiological Sciences, Inc. and that at all times dur-
ing Defendant's employment with Plaintiff up to and including 
July 28, 1978, said contract was in full force and effect and 
valid and binding upon Defendant." (Tr., p. 16; Exhibits 22, 
32, pp. 6-8). 
"12. That on February 28, 1978 the plaintiff through its 
officers and directors had no knowledge of the existence of the 
employment contract under the date of September 4, 1968, and 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Defendant knew of this contract and further knew that Plain-
tiff did not know of this contract and with this knowledge De-
fendant wholly failed and refused to reveal the existence of 
this contract and further deliberately concealed its existence 
while negotiating a separate employment contract on February 28, 
1978." (Tr., pp. 14, 19: R., pp. 162-163; Exhibit 32, pp. 6-8). 
"13. That the September 4, 1968 employment contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant contained conditions limiting Defendant's 
right to compete with Plaintiff. (Exhibits 22: 32, p. 8). 
"14. That unless restrained by this Court, it is likely 
that the defendant Nadeem M. Muna will solicit Plaintiff's cus-
tomers that became known to him while in Plaintiff's employ and 
said Defendant will appropriate to his own use or for the use of 
others the secret and proprietary information of Plaintiff and 
that by using such information, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable 
damage, the amount of which is not capable of exact proof and 
which no adequate remedy at law exists." (Tr., pp. 37, 38, 183, 
186, 192, 194: Exhibits, 26, 27). 
"15. That Defendant has solicited Plaintiff's customers and 
has been in competition with the plaintiff." (Tr., pp. 183, 194; 
Exhibits 26: 27: 32, p. 9). 
This action was conunenced in September, 1978 shortly after 
Defendant resigned from the company. (R., pp. 1-7). 
A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court 
on September 28, 1978. (R., pp. 20-211. 
-6-
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An evidentiary hearing was held on October 26, 1978 at 
which time the trial court granted Plaintiff a preliminary in-
junction against Defendant. Defendant was resti::ained from soli-
citing customers of Plaintiff, using Plaintiff's methods of 
manufacturing, competing with Plaintiff in the sale of four 
specified medical kits, and in rendering services or advice to 
any competitor. (R., pp. 36-37; Ex. 32). 
A full trial was held on July 10, 1979 and July 11, 1979 
before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer. The court took the case 
under advisement and rendered a memorandum decision approximately 
one month after the hearing. (R., pp. 190-191). The court 
granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction against Defendant from 
soliciting Plaintiff's customers for the sale of products pre-
sently manufactured by Plaintiff whose identity Defendant learned 
of during his employment and also enjoined Defendant from com-
peting with Plaintiff in any of Plaintiff's present product lines 
or services for a period of two years. The court required defen-
dant to render an accounting of any profits made from Plaintiff's 
customers and ordered return of any customer lists. (R., pp. 190-
191). 
It is from the memorandum decision and the preliminary in-
junction that this appeal is taken. (R., p. 194). 
ARGUMENT 
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS PROPER. 
-7-
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The trial court after carefully reviewing the evidence pre-
sented to it at the hearing and prior to the hearing determined 
. that Defendant should be restrained from soliciting customers 
of the plaintiff whose identity and location Defendant learned 
of during the course of his employment with Plaintiff, should 
be enjoined from competing with Plaintiff in any of its product 
lines for a period of two years, and should make an accounting 
as to any sales previously made to Plaintiff's customers. (R., 
p. 190}. The court denied Plaintiff's claim for compensatory 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. (R., p. 191). 
This Court is constrained to look at the whole of the evi-
dence in light favorable to the trial court's findings, including 
any fair inferences to be drawn from the evidence and all cir-
cumstances shown, and the trial court's findings should not be 
disturbed unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds 
would be persuaded to the contrary. Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 
P.2d 751 (Utah 1977}; Howarth v. Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1973}. 
Respondents submit that the findings of the trial court 
were supported by competent evidence and were firmly based upon 
two separate legal theories: first, that there existed an ex-
press contract between the parties prohibiting the conduct en-
joined by the trial court; and, second, that there is an implied 
obligation for an employee not to reveal trade secrets or other 
confidential information. 
-8-
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A. The Defendant Was Contractually Restrained From Di-
vulging Information Obtained During His Employment with Plaintiff 
and from Competing with Plaintiff for F.ive Years After Termina-
tion of Employment. 
Two separate agreements were introduced by the parties at 
trial. The first was an agreement entitled, "Management Con-
tract" dated September 4, 1968 (Ex. 22}. The second was an 
agreement entitled "Employment Agreement" dated February 25, 
1978. (Ex. 23). 
Appellant argues that the 1978 agreement was the only con-
trolling document since it was a novation of the first agreement 
or, in the alternative, its terms were inconsistent with the 
first agreement therefore negating by law the terms of the 1968 
contract. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-22). Both of these con-
tentions are erroneous. 
1. The 1968 Contract is Controlling in that the 1978 
Contract was Obtained by Defendant's Failure to Disclose Material 
Facts to the Plaintiff Corporation. 
Appellant maintains that because paragraph l of the 1978 
agreement states that "all previous employment agreements and 
understandings are mutually terminated and settled" that this 
language eliminat.es the viability of the previous agreement. (Ap-
pellant's brief, p. 10). This contention, however, cannot stand 
careful scrutiny. 
Respondent maintained throughout the trial that this second 
agreement was void since the defendant had failed to disclose 
the existence of the prior employment agreement which was a ma-
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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terial fact in the formulation of the second contract. The 
undisputed evidence shows that the corporation had no knowledge 
of the existence of the 1968 agreement prior to the execution 
of the latter agreement. (Tr., pp. 14-19). Plaintiff's presi-
dent stated that the purpose of paragraph 1 was to show that 
Defendant was no longer to be considered the president, general 
manager and chairman of the board of directors and that it was 
not the intent of the parties to specifically revoke prior un-
known agreeaents. ca. t pp• 162-1631 • 
Appellant maintains that he had no affirmative obligation 
to notify the company of this prior agreement since he was no 
longer an officer of the corporation and because of numerous 
alleged indications eliminating a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion. (Respondent's brief, pp. 23-28). Respondent maintains, 
however, that a fiduciary duty did in fact exist and that the 
failure of Defendant to inform the corporation of the prior agree· 
ment justified the trial court's conclusion that the 1978 agree-
ment was void. (R., p. 191). 
It is elementary that a person who is elected as an officer 
or director of a corporation accepts a fiduciary responsibility 
to serve the interests of those who elect him which he must dis-
charge with fidelity and which he should not desert for his own 
personal gain. Cox v. Slagle, 431 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1967); 
Branch v. Western Factors, 502 P.2d 570 (Utah 1972). Thus, if 
Defendant had still retained his status as an officer of the cor· 
-10-
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poration at the time the second contract was presented to him 
it would have be~n his affirmative duty to notify the company 
of the prior agreement when it was obvious that the new manage-
ment was unaware of its existence. 
The fact that Defendant was no longer an officer in the 
corporation does not alter this result. It was to Defendant's 
benefit to induce the plaintiff's corporation into entering in 
a second contract for the purpose of revoking the prior 1968 
agreement which contained numerous restrictions upon Defendant's 
conduct. Thus, while the 1978 contract was made after Defendant 
was no longer an officer in the corporation one of its purposes 
(as now argued by Defendant in his brief} was to allegedly void 
a prior agreement entered into during Defendant's tenure as both 
officer and director. For this reason the general rule cited by 
Respondent that severance of official relationships terminates 
!e· fiduciary duties of former officers to a corporation has no 
r· 
application in this case. (Appellant's brief, p. 27). 
This Court in Glen Allen Mining Company v. Park Galena Mininq 
Company, 296 P. 231 (Utah 1931) addressed this problem. In that 
case officers of a corporation engaged in conduct prior to their 
resignation which had an adverse effect upon the existence on 
the corporate entity. This Court stated: 
The defendants seek to avoid liability on 
the ground that they had in fact ceased to 
act as officers of the company when the con-
tract for the purchase of the mortgage rights 
and the agreement with the creditors to force 
-11-
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a sale of the company's property by execution 
were entered into. But that alone is not 
enough to relieve them. They learned of the 
prospective values of the property and added 
to the financial embarrassment of the plain-
tiff while they were officers. During that 
time they developed and put in motion the 
plans that resulted in each of those contracts • 
• • • Under such conditions, an officer cannot 
avoid responsibility for violating his duties 
as a fiduciary merely by delaying the final 
execution of a contract until the expiration 
·of his relations. The rule governing such a 
situation is well stated in Trice v. Comstock 
(C.C.A.) 121 F. 620, 625, 61 L.R.A. 176, as 
follows: 
Nor is it any defense to the suit to 
enforce this trust that the agency 
had terminated before the confidence 
was violated. The duty of an attor-
ney to be true to his client, or of 
an agent to be faithful to his prin-
cipal, does not cease when the em-
ployment ends, and it cannot be re-
nounced at will by the termination of 
the relation. It is as sacred and 
invioble after as before the expira-
tion of its terms. Id. at 239. (Em-
phasis added}. -
This same principle was supported by a New York court when it 
said, "Were the rule otherwise, the fiduciary obligation would 
disintegrate by resignation of the fiduciary whenever the attrac-
tion of personal gain at the expense of the cestui que trust 
proved stronger than what would then be an unenforceable moral 
obligation." Albert A. Volk Company v. Fleschner Bros., 60 N.Y. 
S.2d 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945). 
The trial court heard evidence that the new management was 
unable to locate any prior employment agreement with the defen-
-12-
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dant. The Board of Directors decided that an agreement should 
be reached with the defendant. (Tr., p. 181. The plaintiff 
corporation was completely dependent upon the representations of 
Defendant and his honesty to inform the president and other mem-
bers of the management as to whether or not there was any prior 
existing management or employment agreement. The defendant did 
not at any time inform the officers of the corporation of the 
prior agreement. (Tr., p. 14; R., pp. 162-163). 
Regardless of any animosity, bad feelings, or "battles" 
Defendant had with Plaintiff corporation he was still under an 
obligation to inform the corporation of any prior agreement be-
fore executing an agreement which allegedly terminated all such 
agreements since the effect of any latter agreement would alter 
the agreement entered into during his fiduciary relationship as 
an officer and director. 
Appellant maintains, however, that Plaintiff corporation 
should have known of this agreement since it eventually produced 
the agreement during the first preliminary injunction hearing. 
Appellant states, "This Court should not permit one party to a 
contract to avoid searching its files and exercising reasonable 
diligence in ascertaining facts pertinent to the contract under 
negotiation." (Appellant's brief, p. 30). 
In fact, however, the undisputed testimony is that a search 
was made of the corporate files by the new president and that no 
agreement was found. It was only by contacting a prior attorney 
-13-
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who had a copy of the agreement in his files that the 1968 agree-
ment was ever found. ('rr., p. 16). Thus, the 1968 agreement 
was missing from the corporate file at the time the second agree-
ment was entered into--such files having been previously main-
tained by the defendant. (Tr., p. 136). The corporation was 
diligent in performing its duties and the failure of the cor-
poration to obtain the docwnents from an outside source cannot 
be used against it as argued by Defendant. 
As stated by one court with reference to this type of ar-
gument: 
When once it is established that there has 
been any fraudulent representation by which 
a person has been induced to enter into a 
contract, it is no answer to his claim to 
be relieved from it to tell him that he 
might have known the truth by proper in-
quiry. He has a right to retort upon his 
objector: "You, at least, who have stated 
what is untrue for the purpose of driving 
me into a contract cannot accuse me of want 
of caution because I relied implicitly 
upon your fairness and honesty. Barren G. 
Collier v. Connelley, 116 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1938). 
Appellant also argues that as a matter of law Plaintiff cor· 
poration should have been charged with notice of the existing 
agreement. Respondent does not dispute the general statement of 
law that notice to a corporate officer or employer is notice to 
the corporation. These rules, however, were derived for the 
benefit of third parties dealing with a corporation and not for 
the benefit of corporate employees themselves who may choose not 
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to notify a corporation of an event for the agent's own bene-
fit. The Enterprise Foundry and Machinery Works case cited by 
Appellant illustrates this example since the plaintiff in that 
case was a third party corporation seeking enforcement of a 
contract with the defendant corporation. (Appellant's brief, p. 
31). 
The law is clear that even an innocent misrepresentation 
on which one rightly relies may invalidate a contract where it 
relates to a material matter. 17 C.J.S., Section 147, p. 902, 
Contracts. Likewise, in the case of persons occupying a fiduciary 
or confidential relation, contracts prejudicial to the interest 
of the subordinate party are ordinarily condemned as presumptive-
ly or constructively fraudulent, so that a_ctual fraud ·ordinarily 
need not be shown. The requisite relation exists in any case 
where there is confidence deposed on one side and a resultant 
domination and influence on the other. C.J.S., ~' at p. 910. 
Plaintiff corporation had no reason to believe that Defen-
dant would not inform it of all material facts relating to the 
formulation of a new contract including the prior employment agree-
ment. Even after the proxy battle and the obvious hard feelings 
generated by it (as noted in Appellant's brief, p. 24) all indi-
cations were that Defendant was going to cooperate and help the 
company in any way he could. (Tr., p. 29}. Plaintiff's presi-
dent stated that right after the proxy battle Defendant and the 
president went to a restaurant and Defendant told the president 
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that he would let bygones be bygones and that he would help the 
company in any way he could. (Tr. , p. 6 6) . This testimony was 
substantiated by Defendant himself. (Tr . , p . 178 ) • 
In sununary, the trial court was correct in finding that 
Defendant had a fiduciary duty during the negotiations of the 
1978 agreement to inform the plaintiff of the existence of the 
1968 agreement and that this concealment made a nullity of the 
second contracts. (R., Vol II, p. 15). This finding is sup-
ported because of the continuing fiduciary duty Defendant owed to 
the company regarding any previous transactions while Defendant 
was an officer and director, the inability of Plaintiff corpora-
tion to learn of the existence of such contract by ordinary 
means, and by the statements of Defendant to the Plaintiff cor-
poration that he would cooperate and help the corporation when-
ever possible. 
For these reasons the result of voiding the 1978 agree-
ment was to make the 1968 agreement controlling including para-
graph 6 which prohibited Defendant from competing with Plaintiff 
for five years after leaving the company or disclosing any in-
formation which was the property of the company. (Exhibit 22) . 
This express contract, therefore, was enforced by the trial court 
by granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff. 
2. Even Assuming Arguendo that the 1978 Contract Re-
mained Valid There was Still no Novation of the 1968 Contract 
and its Consistent Terms Regarding Competition are Enforceable. 
Appellant argues that paragraph 1 of the 1978 agreement 
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stating that all previous employment agreements and understand-
,ings are mutually terminated and settled nullifies the 1968 
agreement. (Appellant's brief, p. 10). This paragraph, however, 
makes no specific reference to the 1968 agreement. Neither does 
it speak in terms of a "management contract" which was the title 
given to the previous contract. The trial court was, therefore, 
justified in determining the intent of the parties concerning 
any ambiguity existing in that paragraph. Lynch v. Spilman, 431 
P.2d 636 (Cal. 1967). 
Plaintiff's president testified that at the time he executed 
the 1978 agreement he was not aware of any prior written agree-
ment in existence. (Tr., pp. 14, 17). He further stated that 
the purpose of paragraph 1 was to show that Defendant was no longer 
to be considered the president, general manager and chairman of 
the board of directors and that it was not the intent of the par-
ties to specifically revoke prior unknown agreements. (R., pp. 
162-163). 
Respondent has argued that a novation occurred substituting 
the latter agreement for the former agreement. It is fundamental, 
however, that whether or not a novation has been accomplished de-
pends upon the intention of the parties. As stated by one legal 
authority: 
Whether or not a novation has been accom-
plished depends upon the intention of the 
parties. This intent is the controlling 
element in determining the question, and, 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unless the transaction was intended to ex-
tinguish the old obligation by substituting 
the new one therefor, a novation is not 
effected. Intention may be determined from 
the facts and circumstances of the trans-
action and the conduct of the parties. 66 
C.J.S., Section 18, p. 703. Novation. 
The requisites of a novation are a previous valid obligation, 
an agreement of all the parties to the new contract, consideration, 
extinguistnnent of the old obligation and the validity of the new 
one. The preexisting obligation must be extinguished or there 
is not a novation. "A mere modification will not suffice; any-
thing remaining of the original obligation prevents a novation." 
Lampley v. Celebrity Homes Inc., 594 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1979). 
Furthermore, the burden of proof as to a novation rests 
upon the party claiming it. D.A. Taylor Company v. Taulson, 552 
P.2d 1274 (Utah 1976). 
Because the evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff was !!!!-
aware of the prior obligation it can hardly be said that the par-
ties intended the 1968 contract to be substituted for the 1978 
agreement. The most Appellant can claim is that Plaintiff waived 
and relinquished all unknown contractual obligations existing 
between the parties. This supposition is both illogical and is 
contradicted by the uncontroverted statement of Plaintiff's presi· 
dent. 
Defendant next asserts that even if a novation did not occur 
a substitution of inconsistent terms would be required and the 
latter agreement would ccntrol. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-21). 
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Once again, Respondent does not dispute the general legal prin-
ciple asserted by Appellant. However, as applied to this situa-
tion it is clear that there is no inconsistency in the non-
competition clauses. 
The 1968 agreement states the following: 
Muna agrees that during the terms of this 
agreement he will not engage in any other 
commercial activity in any way competitive 
with the business of the company, or its 
affiliated companies, and that, for a period 
of five years after leaving the employ of 
the company, he will not engage in any way, 
directly or indirectly, in any business com-
petitive with the company or its affiliated 
companies (.in) any state in which any of 
them do business. Muna further agrees that 
he will not disclose to any other person any 
information which is the property of the 
company or its affiliated companies. {Ex. 
22) (Emphasis added) • 
The latter 1978 agreement states the following: 
During the term of this Agreement Muna shall 
not act as a consultant for, or accept employ-
ment from any competitor of Micro. (Ex. 23}. 
Both agreements state that Muna will not compete with the 
company during the term of each agreement. In addition, however, 
the 1968 agreement requires Muna not to compete after leaving the 
company and restricts him from disclosing information which is 
the property of the company. Thus, there is no inconsistency 
between the two agreements in that the latter agreement does not 
specifically negate nor even address the question of termination 
of employment or disclosure of information. 
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The case of Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman and Co., 101 A.2d 94 
(N.J. Super. 19531 is extremely similar to the instant case. 
In that case a contract was entered into between the plaintiff 
and defendant corporation in 1950 when Plaintiff was a sales 
supervisor for the company. One of the paragraphs expressly 
provided that the plaintiff could not compete against the de-
fendant in certain states for a period of one year after termina-
tion of the contract. 
Thereafter in 1953 the plaintiff ceased to be a sales super-
visor for Defendant but was employed as a salesman. A second 
contract was entered into which also re~tricted Plaintiff's abil-
ity to compete but reduced the geographical area so restricted. 
The plaintiff in Rosenberg contended that the restrictive 
covenant contained in the 1953 agreement superseded the 1950 
agreement. A situation identical to the instant case. 
The court first noted that it is primarily a question of 
the intention of the parties to be ascertained from the contracts 
themselves whether the earlier contract is discharged and super-
seded by a new contract. The terms of the second contract must 
be so inconsistent with those of the former contract that they 
cannot stand together. Id. at 96. The court therein stated: 
The two covenants could have a concurrent 
existence, the first and greater to expire 
by its own terms one year after the date of 
Plaintiff's termination of employment as 
sales manager, and the second, one year after 
the termination of his employment as sales-
man. If there were any reasonable basis for 
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the defendant to require this protection in 
the original contract for one year after the 
termination of employment thereunder by rea-
son of complete disaffiliation of the plain-
tiff with the defendant, there is no sound 
reason for imputing an intent to waive such 
protection from the fact that although the 
employment in one capacity was terminated, 
the plaintiff continued'to be affiliated with 
the defendant in a limited capacity and in a 
limited territory. Id. at 97. 
This same reasoning is applicable here. If there was any 
valid reason for restricting Defendant after leaving the company 
or from disclosing information obtained from the company, that 
reason did not terminate merely because Defendant changed his 
job status. 
A fair reading of the two agreements reveals that the non-
competing clauses are not inconsistent. Both agreements prohi-
bit Defendant from competing during his employment but the 1968 
agreement, in addition, requires that he not compete for five 
years after leaving his employment and that he not divulge in-
formation which is the property of the company. Therefore, re-
gardless of what other inconsistencies may be present as to 
other clauses contained in the two contracts there is no incon-
sistency in the non-competitive clauses and the 1968 agreement 
must be given full force and effect. 
B. Even Assuming Arguendo that there was no Express Con-
tractual Provision Relating to Competition and Disclosure of Se-
crets, there Remains an Obligation Implied by Law Not to Injure 
Defendant's Former Employer. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo, that the provisions in the 
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1968 contract are not binding upon the defendant the trial co"'t ! 
was still justif_ied in restraining Muna from competing or divulging 
confidential information based upon an implied obligation of 
employment. As stated by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals: 
The law is well settled that one of the 
implied terms of a contract of employment 
is that the employee will hold sacred any 
trade secrets or other confidential infor-
mation which he acquires in the course of 
his employment, and that therefore an em-
ployee who has left his employment is under 
an implied obligation not to use trade se-
crets or other confidential information 
which he has acquired in the course of his 
employment, for his own benefit or that of 
a rival, and to the detriment of his for-
mer employer. Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Com-
pany, 407 F.2d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1969). 
Likewise, the Restatement of Agency also establishes an 
implied obligation. It states: 
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termina-
tion of the agency, the agent: 
* * * 
(bl ijas a duty to the principal not to 
use or to disclose to third persons, 
on his own account or on account of 
others, in competition with the prin-
cipal or to his injury, trade secrets, 
written lists or names, or other si-
milar confidential matters given to 
him only for the principal use or 
acquired by the agent in violation 
of duty •••• Restatement (2d) of 
Agenc2:, Section 396 (1958). 
The violation of a trade secret is based upon the violation 
of a confidential relationship and breach of trust rather than on 
the theory that the plaintiff might have a property right in the 
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trade secret. Stimson v. Lawrence-David, Inc. 356 P.2d 84 (Or. 
19601. As stated by the United States Supreme Court: 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable 
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, 
whatever they are, through a special confi-
dence that he accepted. The property may 
be denied, but the confidence cannot be. 
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Company v. 
Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
Thus, an employee may be restrained from revealing informa-
tion even though technically it does not arise to the definition 
of a "trade secret" if such information was obtained through 
confidence and through the employee's status in the company. 
In the instant case, however, the evidence supports the 
trial court's findings that "Plaintiff's formulation of chemi-
cal and nutrients used in the propagation of sales and used in 
the manufacture of its diagnostic test kits are proprietary in-
formation and trade secrets owned by the plaintiff." 
1. The Evidence Supports the Finding of Trade Se-
crets and Confidential Information. 
Appellant has defined "trade secret" in terms of the Re-
statement of Torts, section 757 (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). 
Respondent agrees with this definition and supplements comment 
"b" with the following sentence omitted in the quotation of Ap-
pellant. "It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a pro-
cess of manufacturing ..• preserving materials, a pattern for a 
machine or other device or a list of customers." 
Appellant asserts that under the Restatement of Torts defi-
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nition the proces.ses and ;ro.aterial comprising Plaintiff's test 
kits do not constitute trade secrets and therefore, are not 
deserving of protection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-351. This 
argument is without merit. 
First, a trade secret is not only the ingredients that go 
into making the product but also consists of the correct amounts 
of each ingredient and the particular procedures for mixing them. 
Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 19731. The fact 
that one or more of the ingredients or procedures used in the 
test kits are not unusual does not negate the fact that the en-
tire process can itself be a trade secret utilizing these ma-
terials. 
Second, and most important, Defendant has attempted to 
make an argument based upon testimony and evidence favorable to 
his position while ignoring contrary evidence presented by 
Plaintiff. As stated by this court in Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 
246 (Utah 1976): 
In appealing this case, Brady seems to en-
join this Court with a principle to the ef-
fect that the evidence should be reviewed 
by taking as true everything he would do, 
to the exclusion of any evidence admitted at 
the behest of his opponents, irrespective of 
its weight, credibility, or admissibility--
to which thesis we cannot prescribe. Id. at 
248. 
Appellant devotes some 11 pages in his brief to the analysis 
of each process or ingredient which Appellant claims may have 
been considered by the trial court to constitute a secret. (~p-
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pellant's brief, pp. 31-42). While it is no doubt true, for 
example, that there is evidence in the record showing that spe-
cific items such as isopropyl alcohol is commonly used as a 
fixative, the segregation of each of these items by themselves 
distorts the findings of the trial court. 
As noted by the trial court, the plaintiff's process "ta-
ken as a whole" is not known to the industry and is guarded 
by Plaintiff's security precautions. lR., Vol. II, p. 13). 
Likewise, the record must be examined as a whole to determine 
whether there is support for the trial court's conclusions--
even though they may be contrary to the arguments and evidence 
raised by Defendant. 
Plaintiff's president, Edward Mawod, testified that in 
1969 when the company was started, there were no commercial com-
panies marketing the ANA test kit. (Tr., p. lll. He testified 
that the defendant repeatedly told him not to utilize outside 
consultants since they would not be qualified to assist in that 
the work was unique. lTr., p. 12). He related that it took 
over one year to commercially develop a test for toxoplasmosis. 
(Tr.,p.21). 
He explained the security precautions taken by the company. 
All files are locked in a fireproof vault with the president 
and Dr. Golden, the director of the laboratory, having the only 
keys. (Tr., p. 22}. No person is employed with the company 
until he or she signs an employment agreement of confidentiality. 
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Any visitor must also sign a log and a non-disclosure statement, 
(Tr., p. 23°[. All letters leavin9' the office had to be screened 
personally by Mr. Mawod. (Tr. , p. 3 0). Al though some of these 
procedures were instituted after Mawod became president, others 
were in existence prior to that time as evidenced by the 1968 
employment agreement with Defendant. (Tr., p. 65). 
Plaintiff called Albert Laibovitz, a professional con-
sultant of microbiology, who had been involved in tissue cul-
tures for 23 years. (Tr., pp. 69-70). This witness testified 
that the use of cookie jars and Saran Wrap was highly unusual in 
his experience. (Tr., p. 75).. He stated that by Plaintiff rnak-
ing a slide which had a shelf life of over one year (using mere 
refrigeration rather than freezingl a unique product had been 
produced. (Tr., p. 761. This witness made the following per-
tinent remark after having been examined as to individual ingre-
dients: 
But, I think when you look at a technique, 
you have to look at a technique as a compo-
site method, and so the method of rinsing, 
fixing, and storage and the cells and then 
the slide are stored in phosphate buffered 
saline in the refrigerator up to a period of 
one year, and the method of storage, I think 
all is very unusual and I hadn't seen any-
thing like that before. (Tr., p. 781. (Em-
phasis added) • 
Likewise, after noting that many of the ingredients used 
in the 'test kits were commonly utilized in the scientific com-
munity Mr. Laibovitz then said: 
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Now all of these ingredients have been used 
in a large number of different medil.lltl, but 
not in this combination. And so this com-
bination is a unique combination being used 
in MRC. (Tr., p. 79}. (Emphasis added]. 
The witness stated that with the large number of different 
possible combinations available in development of a kit that 
the chances were 99 out of 100 that the same process would ne-
ver be duplicated by him even with all of his experience. lTr., 
p. 82). He stated that given six months he could perhaps develop 
a test kit but that it would never be any better than that de-
veloped by MRC. (Tr., p. 87}. The witness stated that the ad-
dition of tryptos phosphate broth and a buffer solution gives 
MRC's product an advantage over products of other companies. 
(Tr., p. 85). He also stated, that while other cell lines could 
be used, those employed by MRC made the product superior. (Tr., 
p. 86). 
Dr. Carol Golden, Plaintiff's laboratory director wita a 
degree in microimmunology, also gave her expert opinion as to 
the methods employed by the plaintiff company. She stated, for 
example, that using 27 slides in a baking dish was a unique idea 
and that she was not aware that Saran Wrap could autoclave. 
(Tr., p. 111). She also was unaware that tape could be used 
to hold the slides from floating to the top and she thought the 
tape would be toxic and would cause damage to the cells. (.Tr., 
p. 112). When Dr. Golden first arrived at MRC, she did not un-
derstand why yeast extract, lactalbumen hydrolsate and tryptos-
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phosphate broth were added to the normal media formula. After 
experimenting, she discovered that, the product quality diminished 
when these ingredients were removed. She now uses them for the 
manufacturing process even though she did not know exactly what 
effects the additives produced. (Tr., p. 1171. She stated that 
she would never have chosen that combination of ingredients. 
(Tr., p. 118). 
She noted that even with her experience, she would have a 
great deal of difficulty in devising methods to produce in mass 
quantities tests for ANA, toxoplasrnosis, and herpes. (Tr., p. 
120). She related that she had obtained kits from the major 
competitors, Virgo and Meloy and found that the location of the 
cells on the slides were different and that human cells were not 
used in th.eir kits thus making them inferior. (Tr., p. 120). 
Even the testimony of Defendant himself supports the con-
fidentiality and trade secret claim of the plaintiff. Defendant 
admitted that the company promoted the kits through costly ad-
vertising. He also admitted that the company paid for several 
visits throughout the country promoting the kits and even for 
trips to Canada, Europe, and Costa Rica for promotion of the kits. 
(Tr., pp. 137-139). 
Defendant acknowledged the interview with the Utah Daily 
Record where he stated that MRC had a unique product. 
146; Exhibit 361. 
(Tr., P· 
He also acknowledged that he had made statements in the 
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past that a unique feature of the kits was the human cells bein9 
used rather tfian rat cells which allowed for more uniform test-
ing. · (Tr., p. 155; Exhibit 1) . 
Appellant attempts to discredit Exhibits 1, 5, and 15 
which were letters written by Defendant to various people prais-
ing the use of human cells in the various kits. Appellant as-
serts that he was only praising a certain line of cells which 
existed between 1970 through 1974. (Appellant's brief, p. 51. 
However, Exhibit 9 is a letter written by Defendant in 1976, two 
years after the extinguishment of the special human cells, in 
which he stated, "It is my scientific opinion and conclusion 
that the hmnan amnion cell gives the most reproducible results." 
It was stipulated that Plaintiff is the only conunercial pro-
ducer, known to the parties, of ANA test kits which use the hu-
man amn.ion ce·lls. 
Defendant was asked to read Exhibit 5 which is an article 
for a trade journal written by him in 1974. When asked why he 
referred to the ANA test kit as being superior he replied, "Be-
cause I made it." (Tr., p. 1611. 
While claiming that he had developed several techniques 
prior to his employment with MRC he admitted that at the time of 
the incorporation he received 20,000 share of conunon stock "in 
consideration of the services performed and to be performed and 
processes developed and to be developed" by him. (Tr., P • 132; 
Exhibit 28). Thus, Appellant was handsomely compensated for any 
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kno~led~e or tecb.nique~ ~h..i_ch he claimed to have deyeloped 
prior to lils entry with. the company and such. techniques should 
inure to the benefit of Plaintiff regardless of the general 
rule that prior techniques are not the property of a company. 
(J\.ppe.llant's brief, p. 36). 
Dr. Muna also stated that it took over a year and a half 
to develop the toxoplasmosis kit and that Dr. Wentz was hired 
specifically to assist in this production at an annual salary 
of at least $18,000. (Tr., pp. 164-166). Appellant attempts to 
argue that his 1966 article in the American Journal of Clinical 
Pathology states precisely the same technique which he developed 
for the plaintiff in the manufacturing of ANA kits. (Appellant's 
brief, ·p. 2). However, he admitted that the cells used in that 
article were not human amnion cells, that ether alcohol was used 
rather than isopropyl alcohol, that sodium bicarbonate was not 
used as a fixing agent and that petri dishes were used for the 
article rather than pyrex. (Tr., pp. 199, 222). Finally, the 
defendant admitted that there may well be over 1,000 different 
components for the making of nutrient media for cell cultures. 
(Tr., p. 225). 
After the testimony of Defendant, Plaintiff's president, Ed 
Mawod, was recalled and stated that he had attempted to find the 
foonulas of the medias and techniques used by competitors but 
that he was told by them that they were trade secrets. (Tr., P· 
229}. 
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The preceding recital of facts introduced into trial 
shows that unquestionably there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the findings of the trial court that Plaintiff util-
ized processes and formulas which constituted trade secrets 
and confidential information. Even though Appellant may have 
introduced evidence to the contrary, the trial court was at li-
berty to decide the credibility and weight of the evidence. 
This court has stated that an appellate court will not reverse 
a trial court when the evidence is such as to sustain the find-
ings made and the judgment rendered is based upon the facts 
found and is in accordance with the law of the case. Branch. 
v. Western Factors, Inc., 502 P.2d 570 (Utah. 19721. 
This same principle applies to the court's order concern-
ing customer lists. Mr Mawod testified that the customer list 
is compiled by keeping a list of people doing business with. the 
company. Each time a new customer orders a product, their name 
is put on the list. (.Mawed deposition, pp. 47-481. Thus, this 
list is not a general mail order type of listing but is actual 
customers who use Plaintiff's product. Such lists are entitled 
to injunction protection by a court. In Re Uniservices, Inc., 
517 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1975)~ 28 ALR 3d 7. 
Thus, all of the findings by the trial court are supported 
by competent, credible evidence even though, as noted in Appel-
lant's brief, there is evidence and inferences to the contrary. 
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2. Even U All of Plaintif,f' s Ingredients or Pro-
cesses· were Known to the Public, a Trade Secret Could Still 
Exist. 
Appellant vigorously argues throughout the last portion of 
his brief that niany of the ingredients and processes are gener-
ally known in the scientific connnunity and found in the litera-
ture. This same argument was advanced in Elcor Chemical Corpora-
tion v. Agri-Sul, 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973}. The court 
there noted that Appellants had argued that the process involved 
in that case was not really a secret but .was something that could 
have been obtained by reading articles and trade magazines. The 
court then noted some 15 cases in which similar arguments were 
advanced. The court stated: 
In each of these cases the court rejected 
·the argument now advanced by appellee by 
pointing out that whereas information could 
have been obtained from other sources the 
point is that such was not done. This 
knowledge was a product of their work, the 
combination of apparatus and equipment, 
materials and procedures which made up the 
trade secret that should have been protec~ 
ted. by virtue of the confidential relation-
ship between the parties. Id. at 212-213. 
The court then made an important distinction which is of ten 
overlooked in cases involving trade secrets. The court said: 
It must be born in mind and reiterated that 
the Agri-Sul process is not a patent but a 
trade secret. The essence of ELCOR's action 
is not infringement but the breach of obliga-
tion of good faith imposed by contract. It 
does not Inatter that Miller and Kruse could 
have gained their knowledge from a study of 
books and magazines. The fact is that they 
did not do s·o. Instead, they gained this 
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knowled~e from ELCOR by way of their confi-
~ential relationship and in S"O doing they 
incurred a duty not to use it to ELCOR's· de-
triment. This duty was oreached by them 
and because of this breach, we are comoelled 
by equity to extend to ELCOR adequate injunc-
tive relief. rd. at 213. (Emphasis added). 
This same principle was reiterated in Nucor Corporation v. 
Tennessee Forging Steel Service, 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 19731 
where the court held that even though an engineer could have pre-
pared plans for a plant without the use of the existing plans 
for another company's plant, this did not minimize the breach 
of trust by the plant owner's former employee who used the plans 
for a competitor. 
Likewise, in Stimson Lumber Company v. Laurence David, Inc. 
356 P.2d 84 COr. 1960) the court noted thac even if a formula 
used by the plaintiff was commonly known and could be used by 
others, this still would not justify its use by the defendant 
if he confidentially acquired the information. The court there 
quoted the Restatement of Torts which states: 
Although given information is not a trade se-
cret, one who receives the information in a 
confidential relation or discovers it by im-
proper means may be under some duty not to 
disclose or use that information. Because 
of the confidential relation or the improprie-
ty of the.means of discovery, he may be com-
pelled to go to other sources for the infor-
mation. Id. at 87. 
In summary, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument 
that all of the ingredients and processes used by Plaintiff were 
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known in po,t;tions: o~ the sc ienti,f ic CO.IJJ!tluni ty and eyen i.f it 
were assumed that tlle exact processe!:f and procedures were also 
used in the scientific cOI11111unity, Defendant would still be 
restrained from using the method$ obtained through his employ-
ment if he acquired such information during a confidential 
relationship. The law does not allow a defendant to begin 
searching for other sources of information in the general scien-
tific community to justify knowledge which he has in fact ob-
tained solely from his employment. 
For these reasons, the trial court could properly enjoin 
Defendant from competing with Plaintiff in the same product 
line and from utilizing Plaintiff's customer list even if it 
is found that no express contractual prohibition exists. 
In closing, it should also be observed that while Appellant 
claims that the injunction is overly broad and ambiguous this 
question was never presented b~fore the trial court in order 
that any clarification could be made. The practice of urging 
on appeal what can be_ perhaps cured in the lower court should 
no~.~~ .... ~?:~red. 
·;... 1 ... •• 
The trial court has considerable discretion in granting in-
junctive relief.to an aggrieved party. In this case the court 
could easily justify a two-year injunction against competition 
based upon the smallness of the plaintiff corporation, the prior 
conduct of Defendant in soliciting Plaintiff's customers, and 
the availability of work for Defendant which would not compete 
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with Plaintitt. The injunction was correctly entered. 
CONCLUS'ION 
The express 1968 contract forbade Defendant from competing 
with Plaintiff after termination of employment. This agreement 
is controlling since the latter agreement was void, or, in the 
alternative, the non-competition clause was never modified by 
the latter agreement. 
In addition, there exists an implied obligation not to util-
ize or divulge trade secrets acquired through employment. The 
evidence justified both a finding of trade secrets and a breach 
by Defendant. 
The imposition of a two-year injunction was not unreasonable 
in that Defendant could still perform other work and would be 
allowed to compete against Plaintiff at the termination of the 
injunction. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
HENS COOK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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